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3. Why care about carers? 
Claire Murray 
Chapter in Mary Donnelly and Claire Murray (eds.), Ethical and Legal Debates in Irish 
Healthcare: Confronting Complexities (Manchester University Press, 2016), pp.41-52. 
 
Introduction  
Rights are increasingly important in health law, both from a theoretical and a practical 
perspective. Respecting the autonomy and dignity rights of individuals should 
ultimately lead to more positive outcomes for people who engage with the health 
services because recognising them as rights subjects requires that they are treated with 
respect and their voices are listened to. Many of the chapters in this book are concerned 
with rights: identifying areas where rights have not been respected; teasing out how 
rights could best be protected; considering how to balance competing rights. The 
understanding of rights we are most familiar with is based on a traditional liberal 
approach which is very individualistic (Rawls, 1999; 2005). It conceives of the rights-
holder as an individual existing in isolation and fails to acknowledge the reality that 
individuals exist in contexts – they are situated within communities and in relationships 
with others. Very often those relationships are caring in nature. However, a rights-based 
framework grounded in traditional liberalism cannot accommodate a dependent rights-
subject. The result is that the position of carers and those who depend on care are not 
adequately recognised or supported within the legal framework.  
This chapter argues that we should care about carers, and this should be 
recognised in the law, because this more accurately reflects the reality of people’s lives 
 
 
and because carers and cared for persons have highlighted the practical difficulties that 
arise when the legal framework fails to acknowledge this reality. As Kittay has observed 
‘when care is not adequately supported, either the cost of care is borne by the caregiver 
alone or the charge fails to receive adequate care – or both suffer’ (2001: 575). If we 
accept that we should care about carers then it is very important that we think about 
how we conceptualise the caring relationship. This is because how we think about the 
caring relationship will impact on what a reformed legal framework which recognises 
carers looks like and how it operates. As Nedelsky notes ‘a relational self requires 
relational conceptions of values, which then require appropriate forms of law and rights 
built around those conceptions’ (2011: 5). In considering a contextual approach to 
rights, which is what a recognition of carers requires, it is possible to consider the carer 
and the cared for person as one unit or it is possible to see them as two separate 
individuals who are interconnected through the relationship of care. Each of these 
approaches gives rise to very different outcomes for the people involved and both will 
be interrogated in this chapter.  
This chapter first considers why we should care about carers and engages with 
different theoretical approaches to recognising the caring relationship and the 
implications of this for those involved in such relationships. In particular the chapter 
considers an approach grounded in the ethic of care and one based on relational 
autonomy. The chapter then moves on to examine an area of Irish health law where 
carers are clearly excluded from the legal framework – the mental health system. The 
mental health system is a useful case-study as it illustrates the complexities around this 
issue. Ultimately this chapter concludes that it is important to care about carers, but 
 
 
doing so must be in a manner which continues to respect the distinct individual rights of 
each of the parties to the caring relationship.  
 
The situated subject, relational autonomy and rights 
There are theoretical, legal and practical reasons why it makes sense to acknowledge 
within the legal framework that individuals exist in relationships with others. Arguably 
the strongest reason to do this is because it is in fact the reality of the situation. Feminist 
theorists and others arguing from a critical perspective have repeatedly highlighted the 
shortcomings of the traditional liberal rights-based model which is developed around 
the fictional abstract individual (Gilligan, 1982; Minow, 1990; Mullally, 2006; Sandel, 
1998). Engagement with a more nuanced theoretical foundation for the legal 
framework, based around a situated subject, allows for the development of laws which 
more accurately reflect the lived realities of those directly affected by them. This 
ensures that the laws are more likely to effectively meet the needs of those they are 
designed to protect. At present there is a strong sense among carers that the work that 
they do is not recognised or appreciated by the State, and this impacts on both carers 
and those cared for. 
Traditional liberal rights discourse is developed around the construct of the 
abstract, rational, autonomous individual. This rights subject is devoid of characteristics 
and is not connected to others. The individualist model of law is underpinned by this 
conception of the subject of rights. Critiques of traditional liberal rights discourse 
highlight the fictional nature of this subject and instead urge us to look beyond this 
traditionally accepted rights subject and instead to look to the realities of peoples’ lives 
 
 
(Sandel, 1998: 179). The process of critically engaging with this liberal construction of 
the subject of rights has led to the development within feminist theories of the concept 
of the situated subject. This involves recognising that people exist within relationships: 
with family, with carers, and in communities. Feminist theorists believe that such a 
subject – clothed in characteristics and interconnected to others – provides a more 
realistic foundation on which to base a theory of morality.  
 
Ethic of care 
One theoretical framework which centres on interconnection is based on an ‘ethic of 
care.’ The meaning of ‘ethic of care’ is not fixed and unmoving but Herring sets out a 
number of principles which underpin this theoretical approach (Herring, 2013: 49-64). 
The first is that care is part of being human and as such it should be valued. The second 
is that emotions are ethically significant. Thirdly, people are relational and their 
interests are interconnected. Fourthly, responsibilities are important. Finally, an ethic of 
care requires a rejection of abstract moral rules. In discussing the concept of 
interconnection, Herring states that ‘emphasising interdependence and mutuality 
means that the division between carer and cared for dissolves’ (2013: 166). This 
suggests that within this understanding of the ethic of care it is appropriate to view 
those in a caring relationship as one unit. Herring refers to ‘give and take’ in the carer 
and cared for relationship and highlights the importance of seeing decisions in the 
context of the relationship between the two people. According to Herring, this will avoid 
carers being treated as ‘objects to be manipulated as part of patient care’ (2013: 167). In 
what he acknowledges to be a controversial claim, Herring goes on to state that ‘even an 
 
 
interference in the wishes of a person with capacity can be justified when the relational 
context is taken into account’ (2013: 173).  
This version of the situated subject, and this conception of the ethic of care, 
raises concerns that it defines an individual too much in relation to others and it is in 
fact paternalism operating under another name. The risk is that the particular needs 
and rights of the individual subject become engulfed within the needs of the group or 
community or become overshadowed by the needs of the other party to the 
relationship. By stating that the ultimate consideration is the relational self, without the 
backdrop of a rights framework, we lose a valuable means of supporting weaker groups 
in society. This has the potential to cause particular difficulties for individuals who 
already tend to be recognised in relation to another, such as women, children, and 
people with disabilities. Another group that could come within this category are carers 
as they too are very often defined in relation to the person they are caring for. 
 
Situated subject/relational autonomy 
There is therefore a need to balance an awareness of the situated subject with an 
acknowledgment of individual rights that inhere in each person. This is at the core of 
relational autonomy theory (McKenzie and Stoljar, 2000). The concept of relational 
autonomy is subject to varied definitions (McKenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Herring, 2009; 
Sclater et al, 2009). However it often draws on critical feminist theories and as Nedelsky 
notes ‘one of the contributions of feminism to relational theory is that it is particularly 
unlikely to make the mistake of romanticising community or relationship’ (2011: 32).  
For the purpose of this chapter what is significant is that theories of relational 
 
 
autonomy emphasise the individual in context while also retaining the importance of 
autonomy. Nedelsky sees the aim of relational autonomy as ‘transforming a traditionally 
individual conception of the self into a relational one without subsuming the individual 
into the collective’ (2011: 13).  
This insistence on retaining the distinct rights of the parties while 
acknowledging their interdependence is particularly important in areas where 
individual rights have so recently been recognised, for example for people with 
disabilities. The challenge then is to develop a legal framework which balances the 
rights and interests of the parties to a relationship and which supports those involved in 
the relationship to ensure that it is a positive and functioning relationship to the 
greatest extent possible.  
The conception of autonomy within a relational approach is different to that set 
out in the traditional liberal understanding. According to Nedelsky, under a relational 
approach autonomy is not equated with independence but rather ‘autonomy is made 
possible by constructive relationships’ (2011: 118). Therefore it is through the 
existence of positive relationships and supports, including relationships of care, that 
individuals are in a position to exercise autonomy. As noted previously, relational 
autonomy is a useful approach as it does not assume that all relationships are beneficial 
and it does not seek to maintain them in all circumstances (Donnelly and Murray, 2013: 
399). A functioning relational approach to law therefore should operate to balance the 
rights and needs of both parties and allow individuals to extricate themselves from bad 
relationships and enhance positive relationships which support the exercise of 
autonomy. An approach that views the parties to a relationship as one unit, as discussed 
above, would make this much more difficult. Failing to have any regard for the needs 
 
 
and rights of either party to a relationship of care will not contribute to developing a 
constructive relationship between the parties involved. It does not permit the carer or 
the cared for person to flourish or to exercise his or her right to autonomy and both are 
essential to the development and maintenance of positive relationships.  Kittay argues 
from a relational perspective that those who advocate on behalf of people with 
disabilities (she is primarily concerned with people with profound intellectual 
disabilities) must look beyond liberalism, while still respecting the core values of 
autonomy and liberty, to ‘seek conditions that are just to the caregiver as well as 
conducive to good care and justice for the charge’ (Kittay, 2001: 562).  
 
Human rights context 
Article 8 of the ECHR protects the right to private and family life. This has been 
recognised as giving rise to rights for carers on their own behalf in England and Wales 
in the case of R (A and B, X and Y) v East Sussex County Council and the Disability Rights 
Commission [2003] EWHC 167 (Admin) and by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Dordevic v Croatia [2012] ECHR 1640. One of the key concerns for carers is an absence 
of information (Wilson et al., 2014; CPsychI, 2013).  As noted by the REFOCUS group, 
carers ‘wish to support the patient and the clinician in the process of recovery and, in 
this context, the provision of appropriate and agreed information is crucial’ (CPsychI, 
2013: 8). Article 8 could possibly be used to ground a right to information for carers 
within the legal framework. Herring states that if a decision is being taken by or in 
relation to an individual that would seriously impact on the carer then the carer’s 
Article 8 rights will also be engaged (2013: 166). However it is important to note that 
the privacy rights of individuals are very important and must be respected and taken 
 
 
into consideration, they cannot be disregarded because the person is in a caring 
relationship. As Nedelsky states ‘to insist on the centrality of relationships in human 
lives is not to deny the value of privacy or solitude’ (2011: 33). 
While the ECHR has been interpreted as recognising some rights for carers, the 
position in relation to carers is not quite as strong in the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The family is mentioned in the CRPD in the Preamble 
which states that:  
the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State, and that persons with disabilities and their 
family members should receive the necessary protection and assistance to 
enable families to contribute towards the full and equal enjoyment of the rights 
of persons with disabilities. 
The Preamble, however, does not contain binding obligations and the CRPD itself does 
not include any distinct and independent rights for family members or carers (Kayess 
and French, 2008: 25). In fact the CRPD elevates the rights of the individual with a 
disability above those of the family members. Kayess and French state that the CRPD 
challenges the accepted construction of people with disabilities as burdens on family 
members and of always being in a dependant role within the family (2008: 5). Within 
the rights-based framework of the CRPD, people with disabilities are cast in an 
instrumental rather than a passive role. While this can be welcomed as a move away 
from a more controlling or paternalistic approach to people with disabilities, it is argued 
that it does serve to further perpetuate the individualistic model of rights. Yes, it is 
important that people with disabilities are seen as having an independent, autonomous 
existence and are not always viewed in association with family members/carers. 
 
 
However, the other extreme is also unsatisfactory, where people with disabilities are 
viewed out of context, without acknowledging the very important familial and caring 
relationships which do exist. This chapter is based on the understanding that the reality 
is that all human beings exist within relationships and require care at some point and 
failing to recognise that within the legal framework results in laws which are not fit for 
purpose because they do not reflect the lived reality of those affected by them (Fineman, 
2008; 2012).  
That said there are also provisions within the CRPD which could be said to 
support a contextual approach and greater recognition of carers. Article 19 requires 
States Parties to recognise the right of persons with disabilities to live independently 
and to be included in the community, and this includes access to in-home, residential 
and other community support services necessary to achieve this (Article 19(b)). Article 
12 of the CRPD concerns legal capacity and recognises the importance of support and 
assistance to facilitate persons with disabilities to make and communicate decisions and 
in this respect adopts a relational understanding of autonomy. The CRPD also places an 
obligation on States Parties to provide support to families and carers so they can fulfil 
the necessary support role for persons with disabilities (Article 12). 
 Having set out the theoretical and human rights justifications for why we should 
care about carers and argued in favour of conceptualising the caring relationship from a 
relational autonomy perspective this chapter now turns to examine the current Irish 
provisions in relation to carers in the context of the mental health system. 
 
 
 
 
The current position of carers in the mental health system in Ireland 
Government policy and medical practice is beginning to acknowledge the importance of 
carers of those with mental illness in Ireland but the legislation, the Mental Health Act 
2001 (MHA 2001), is completely silent on the issue. This gives rise to a situation where 
the key stakeholders are moving towards a more relational approach but the underlying 
legal framework cannot support this. There are historical reasons for this situation; 
until very recently the individual rights of mental health service users were not 
recognised and very significant powers were placed in the hands of others, including 
family members and carers. As a result the MHA 2001 adopted a strictly individualistic 
approach to rights. Mental health law and the mental health system in Ireland therefore 
provides a useful case-study for considering the question of recognising carers as it 
illustrates the difficulties that arise when the law does not engage with carers but it also 
stands as a warning about the risks associated with neglecting the individual rights of 
vulnerable people. This section of the chapter will outline Government policy in relation 
to carers and highlight the difficulties identified by carers who engage with the system 
before setting out the current legal position. This will demonstrate the dissonance 
between the law and the broader operation of the system.  
 
Government policy on carers 
The National Carers’ Strategy – Recognised, Supported, Empowered was published in 
2012 (DOHC). This developed from a commitment in the Programme for Government 
(2011) to support carers. The Strategy sets out a vision statement that ‘carers will be 
recognised and respected as key care partners. They will be supported to maintain their 
 
 
own health and well-being and to care with confidence’ (2012: 2). While this is 
commendable, the strategy almost immediately goes on to note the difficult financial 
circumstances in which the recognition of carers is being introduced and the proposals 
to reform the health system in Ireland and therefore commits to ‘[a]ctions for the short 
to medium term, which can, to the greatest extent possible, be achieved on a cost 
neutral basis’ (2012: 4). Nevertheless it is significant that Government policy explicitly 
recognises that caring about carers is important and that the strategy recognises the 
need to support carers to provide good care but also to ensure that they maintain their 
own health and do not become socially isolated (2012: 9). 
While carers are not explicitly recognised in the MHA 2001, they do feature in 
the Government policy on mental health set out in the Vision for Change document 
(DOHC, 2006). Chapter 3 is entitled ‘Partnership in care: Service users and carers’ and it 
notes that ‘there is a need to formally recognise and support through practical means 
the crucial role of family care in mental health service provision’ (DOHC, 2006: 28).  The 
Expert Group recommended the provision of practical supports to carers such as access 
to information and education, planned respite care and inclusion in the care planning 
process (with the agreement of the service user) (2006: 29). However delivering on 
these recommendations has proved almost impossible in circumstances where there is 
no statutory obligation to recognise the role and position of carers in supporting the 
provision of mental health services and where limited resources have seen an 
increasing move towards what Carney characterises as the ‘hollowed-out State’ (Carney, 
2008: 102). 
 
 
 
 
Concerns of carers 
In spite of these policy commitments, carers of people with mental illness continue to 
face challenges when engaging with the law and the mental health system. The 
REFOCUS forum of the College of Psychiatrists of Ireland published a paper on the needs 
of carers in 2013. The forum consists of service users and carers and the paper 
identifies ten themes, some interlinking and overlapping, identified by carers and it is 
worth setting those out. The themes are: the need for explicit recognition of the crucial 
role of carers; the need to acknowledge the unique impact of mental health difficulties 
of a family member on carers; the need for provision of information, knowledge and 
prognoses to carers; the recognition of the possible enduring nature of mental health 
problems; the use/abuse of patient confidentiality to justify lack of communication; the 
importance of continuity of care; the issues of aftercare and follow-up; the role and 
importance of support groups and self-help organisations; the need for a formal, robust 
complaints mechanism and information in relation to same; formal and structured 
recognition of carers as important contributors in the training of psychiatrists (2013). 
Many of these themes are also identifiable in the Government policy and strategy 
documents discussed above. This illustrates the disconnect between the aspirations of 
the service providers and the experience of those engaging with the service. In the 
conclusion to this document the College of Psychiatrists state that: 
the perspective of carers needs to be incorporated, and structured in a formal 
manner, into the curricula of trainee psychiatrists and ongoing CPD programmes. 
It is only in this way that the perspective of carers will have a transformative and 
enduring impact on the provision of mental health services in the country (2013: 
12).  
 
 
This is significant as it is important to ensure that any recognition of carers 
within the mental health system is taken on board by those charged with delivering the 
service at the front line. Experience with the implementation of the MHA 2001 has 
illustrated that changing the law alone is insufficient to ensure a change in practice 
(Murray, 2013). However, this chapter argues that a change in policy and practice alone 
is also insufficient. The changes in policy and practice outlined here are welcome 
developments but there needs to be a formal recognition of carers in the legal 
framework as well as without this, the contribution of carers and their rights and 
interests will remain invisible within the normative framework. The consequence is that 
the individualistic model of rights will remain, with the result that the rights and 
interests of one party in the caring relationship will continue to be prioritised over the 
other. This is not a just outcome for the carer or the cared for person. 
 
Mental health law 
The MHA 2001 was heralded as a rights-based model of mental health law when 
introduced and, given that it incorporated automatic periodic review of detention 
(section 17 and section 18) and enshrined the principle that people admitted under the 
terms of the Act could consent to treatment (section 56) for the first time in Ireland, this 
claim had a certain legitimacy. However the interpretation of the MHA 2001 by the 
courts and those implementing the statutory provisions has resulted in a reduction in 
the effectiveness of the rights-based model (Murray, 2013; Whelan, Ch. 14). The 
exclusive focus on individual rights in the MHA 2001 was in part a response to the very 
central role accorded to family members in the preceding legislation, the Mental 
Treatment Act 1945 (the 1945 Act). Under the 1945 Act there were many instances of 
 
 
family members committing people into institutional care with very little oversight and, 
in the absence of adequate (or any) review mechanisms people could spend a 
considerable period incarcerated in inappropriate conditions (Prior, 2012; Boland, 
2001; Boland and Laing, 1999/2000; Barry, 2009). Given this historical background, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the MHA 2001 provides a very minimal and peripheral role 
for relatives/carers.  However the consequence is that carers are almost invisible within 
Irish mental health law.  
To the extent that carers have a role within the framework of the MHA 2001, it is 
in relation to involuntary admission – relatives and spouses (who very often fulfil a 
caring role) are included in the list of people who can apply to a medical practitioner for 
a recommendation for involuntary admission. The MHA 2001 states that a person may 
be admitted to an ‘approved centre’ on the basis that he or she suffers from a ‘mental 
disorder’. The application for admission may be made by a spouse or (same sex) civil 
partner; by a relative; by an authorised officer (generally, a social worker); a member of 
the Garda Síochána; and, finally, by any other person (which may include carers who are 
not related to the individual). As noted elsewhere a ‘relative’ is extremely broadly 
defined and there is no statutory hierarchy of relatives, with all having an equal right to 
apply for admission (Donnelly and Murray, 2013: 386). The reality in Ireland is that the 
majority of involuntary admissions are commenced by the spouse or relative of the 
person admitted. This can have a detrimental impact on the relationship between the 
family members involved. In many instances it would be more appropriate for such an 
application to be commenced by an independent outsider. Unfortunately, there are very 
few authorised officers in Ireland and so this alternative route to admission is very 
often not available.  
 
 
Once the application for a recommendation has been made, the role of the 
relative/carer disappears. Family members have no legal entitlement either to apply for 
discharge of the patient or to be informed in respect of the decision to discharge or of 
the discharge itself. There is no statutory requirement that the relatives/carers be given 
information relating to the rights of the individual who is involuntarily admitted even 
where the person admitted lacks capacity. Section 4(2) of the MHA 2001 requires that 
patients should be provided with notification of proposed recommendations or 
treatment and that they must be entitled to make representations in relation to the 
proposals. However, where the person lacks capacity, there is no legislative 
requirement to notify family members or carers and they have no statutory entitlement 
to make representations on behalf of the patient. The proposed capacity legislation is 
likely to address this shortcoming as there will be an obligation on medical 
professionals treating an individual to engage with carers where the carer is fulfilling a 
role under the terms of the capacity legislation. However this will not apply to all people 
admitted under the terms of the MHA 2001. 
Finally, in any discussion of the absence of carers within the MHA 2001 it is 
important to note that the current legislative framework locates very considerable 
power with the medical profession. The lack of a role for carers could therefore also be a 
consequence of a heavily medicalised model of care and treatment which does not allow 
for any perspectives other than those of the consultant psychiatrist.  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter argues that the current individualistic framework for rights in healthcare 
fails to reflect the reality that individuals exist in relationships with others and argues 
that what is required instead is a contextual approach to rights.  It is for this reason that 
we should care about carers and this should be reflected in the legal framework – at 
present the law is out of line with Government policy on this issue. However, it is 
important to take time to consider how we conceptualise the caring relationship as this 
will shape how carers are recognised in law and this will have consequences for both 
carers and those cared for. The chapter rejects an approach based on the ethic of care 
which sees the parties to a caring relationship as one unit because of concerns that the 
individual becomes subsumed within the bigger unit. This is particularly damaging for 
those who have traditionally not been recognised as rights holders. Instead the chapter 
argues in favour of adopting a relational autonomy approach which recognises the 
individual in context while continuing to respect the individual autonomy rights of the 
parties involved. Such an approach would ensure that the rights and interests of both 
parties are taken into consideration and this would be more likely to give rise to 
positive relationships of care which allow both parties to flourish. 
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